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INTRODUCTION 
As R.P. Smith1 observed, many models of national defense assume that 
social welfare depends both on civilian output and on security. Overall 
security is in part a function of military expenditures. As Smith noted, 
'The role of the state is then to balance the welfare benefits of extra 
security derived from military expenditures with its opportunity cost in 
forgone civilian output. '2 
Implied in this model is that, ceteris paribus, the level of military 
expenditures will in large part be a function of economic conditions on the 
one hand and the regime type (as a proxy for defense/non-defense 
priorities) on the other hand. The purpose of this paper is to forecast 
military expenditures in a major developing country, Argentina. 
Argentina was chosen largely because of its importance as a major Third 
World arms producer and military power. In addition it has experienced 
marked changes in regime type and wide fluctuations in both economic 
activity and military expenditures during the last decade. Thus the 
country would appear ideal for the type of analysis described below. 
METHODOLOGY 
Several steps are involved in forecasting the optimal path of the 
Argentinean economy and the subsequent budgetary allocations between 
defense and non-defense activities. First, a macroeconomic model was 
developed which was capable of forecasting 1990 values. Parameters for 
external impacts (such as foreign debt) were established assuming a set of 
national economic priorities. A policy package was formulated which 
would be acceptable to the Argentine authorities and which would also be 
consistent with International Monetary Fund (IMF) austerity guidelines. 
As a next step, the most efficient optimal growth paths were simulated 
under various assumptions regarding the country's external debt 
situation. In addition, military expenditures were forecast through 1990 
consistent with the model just described. Finally, to illustrate the political 
dimension of Argentina's budgetary process and priorities, we estimated 
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changes in the level of military expenditures if a Peronist regime were to 
come back into power during the 1987-90 time period. 
The Macroeconomic Model 
The macroeconomic model used to forecast the Argentine economy was 
statistically estimated using a two-stage least squares procedure to 
establish the parameters of the model and to correct for any simultaneous 
bias in the estimates. The model, consisting of 66 equations,3 was 
estimated for the period 1970-83 from data published by The World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund. 4 Lack of comparable data made 
longer term estimates of real (constant price) aggregates impossible. 
The model depicts the major financial and national account flows in the 
economy and the various Central Government budgetary items. The 
model is 'closed' with 14 national income and balance of payments 
identities. One of the major elements of the model is the estimation of 
military expenditures. They are assumed to be a function of (a) military 
expenditures in the previous year, (b) the political regime in power, and 
(c) whether a Falklands/Malvinas type conflict existed. The latter two 
variables were included in the model through the use of dummy variables. 
With regard to the political regime in power, two sets of dummy 

















The second dummy variable was found to be highly significant in 
explaining the impact of regime change on military expenditures. 5 
Everything else equal, the second military regime was most inclined to 
allocate funds to defense, followed by the first military regime, and finally 
the Peronists. The other dummy variables included in the overall model 
took into account the increase in public ~onsumption in 1983, the 
austerity programs of 1982 and 1983, and the Falklands/Malvinas war in 
the same two years. 
The other major features in the model are that import prices are linked 
to world inflation and export prices and linked to imports. In addition, the 
volume of Argentine exports was a function of the expansion of the US 
economy. The financial equations were driven primarily by the nominal 
credit to the public sector. The money supply is assumed to increase with 
increases in public sector credit, and inflation is linked to the growth in 
the money supply. 
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With regard to budget allocations by the central government, the 
model assumes that the share for debt servicing is dependent on the 
government's external debt and deficit, whereas the amount for 
economic development is a function of debt servicing. Since several 
functional areas (development, social services, health, social security and 
welfare, and other social services) contract, as debt servicing obligations 
increase, a political constraint could have been introduced to limit the 
extent to which debt servicing (and therefore total public sector debt) 
could expand without major opposition. It was not included however 
since the Alfonsin government has given no clear indication as to the 
limits beyond which it is unwilling to cut basic services to resume service 
to the debt. 
In sum, the model is designed to examine Argentina's growth prospects 
over the 1984-90 period. It is policy-oriented in that it can examine the 
impact of various policy tools and the subsequent impact on the economy. 
It is capable of depicting the trade-offs usually associated with 
macroeconomic policy-making and indicating the most efficient policy 
package to resolve the trade-offs. 
Policy Assumptions 
The policy design open to the Argentine authorities over the forecast 
period is based on many of the ideas developed within the World Bank,6 
and by Kiel,7 and the conclusions of others,8 that traditional orthodox 
monetarist and Keynesian policies cannot be implemented in Argentina 
at the present time. Five main policy assumptions have been built into our 
model. First, inflation must be gradually reduced to create some sort of 
stable environment for output to expand; it is assumed that inflation can 
only be controlled by reducing increases in the money supply. Second, the 
government must gradually reduce its deficit without precipitating a 
major recession. Third, real external public debt is not allowed to expand 
between now and 1990. Fourth, external balance must be achieved so that 
the country can service its foreign debt. Finally, given the present state of 
industry, it is assumed that no major expansion in industrial output is 
likely to take place at least in the near future. 
It follows from these five points that private consumption and private 
investment must expand relative to that of the public sector if Argentina is 
to have any hope of reducing inflation and avoiding the concomitant 
recession stemming from the lack of aggregate demand. What is 
suggested therefore is a policy mix which gradually contracts the 
government sector and at the same time expands the private sector 
toward the existing but underutilized industrial capacity. 
In terms of specific policy tools, the government could control real 
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investment and/or consumption, and real or nominal credit from the 
banking system to the public sector.9 In a country with annual inflation 
levels over 100 per cent, the prospect of controlling any real variables 
makes little sense since the magnitudes of the variables are unknown until 
after the fact. Forecasts of the inflationary impact of government policy 
are at best hazardous in a hyperinflationary environment. The instability 
in Argentina and the difficulty in predicting the public's inflationary 
expectations makes the process of estimating a futile task. 
ECONOMIC FORECASTS 
From this discussion, it appears that the only remaining viable policy tool 
is the amount of nominal bank credit. In the initial forecast made below it 
is assumed that the Central Bank (with full support from the IMF) will 
gradually reduce nominal bank credit to the public sector by 
approximately 10 per cent each year from the 1984 level. 10 Furthermore, 
it is assumed that the dummy variables take on values to reflect (a) a 
continuation of the present regime, (b) continuing austerity, (c) a return 
to a non-conflict situation, and ( d) government consumption remaining at 
its high 1983 level. Finally, it is assumed that external public debt is held 
constant at its 1983 level (i.e. approximately $20,501 million) for the 
entire period. 
The 199011 results of this initial forecast in which 1990 GDP was 
maximized - given the above credit and debt constraints - is shown in 
Table 1, Col. (1). Real GDP can grow without a recession but only at an 
average annual rate of 2.8 per cent. While private sector investment is still 
nearly one-half its 1980 level, it expands at 5.5 per cent annually. Due to 
inflation, real bank creditto the government contracts at 5.8 per cent per 
annum. Military expenditures, which fell sharply in 1984, gradually 
expand to their 1982 level in 1987 and it is forecast that they expand at 2.3 
per cent annually over the period. Both the current account and the 
external gap move from large deficits in 1983 to forecast moderate 
surpluses in 1990. 
The forecast results if external public debt were to decline at an average 
annual rate of 5 per cent are shown in Table 1, Col. (2). The benefits 
which would accrue to Argentina through a successful effort to reduce 
external debt is clear - increased GDP growth, higher private 
consumption and investment, and a more favorable balance of payments 
situation. However, given the current economic situation, in our opinion 
it is unlikely that substantial progress will be made in reducing this debt. 
More likely, the status quo (Col. (1) ) is the best that can be hoped for. 
External Public Debt 
Current Account, Balance 
of .Payments 
External Gap 
Inflation rate j (CPI) 
TABLE 1 
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As a next step, the effects of 'mild' and 'severe' stabilization programs 
were examined for their impact on the economy and defense 
expenditures. Both forecasts assume that external public debt remains 
constant at the 1983 level over the period. The mild and severe programs 
reduce the central bank credit to the government by 3.1 per cent and 8.8 
per cent, respectively. The results (Table 1, Cols. (3) & ( 4) ) indicate the 
tangible benefits to be derived from austerity. Real GDP can grow at 3.2 
per cent annually with a severe austerity program, although the growth in 
private consumption is slightly lower under the severe program than the 
mild program. Interestingly, the government, through the tight credit 
control to itself, can gain a larger share of resources since inflation is 
reduced. Similarly, military expenditures grow at a l. 9 per cent annual 
rate under a mild program and at a 2. 7 per cent rate under a severe 
program of austerity. Politically, the stimulating effects of the latter 
program might well not be worth the costs; as noted above the private 
sector would not have a marked improvement in its standard of living to 
compensate for the likely short-run increase in unemployment. 
It seems as if the forecasts made assuming a moderately austere 
program (Col. (1) ) appear superior in terms of the policy goals outlined 
above - a reduction in inflation, the expansion of the public sector, and 
the improvement in the balance of payments. Most importantly, holding 
the nominal external debt constant at the approximate 1983 level is 
feasible. 
The e~timated budgetary implications of the moderately austere 
program are shown in Table 2. There is a slight decline in military 
expenditures and a significant increase in social services, with the largest 
increases being in health and housing services. Finally, we have compared 
the level of military expenditures if a Peronist type regime were to come 
into power in 1987 with the level assuming no change in regime (both 
under the assumptions of the moderate program). As can be seen in Table 
3, there would be an immediate reduction in defense expenditures in 1987 
on the assumption that the Peronists would assume the populist programs 
which characterized the 1973-76 period. By 1990 we estimate that the 
level of military expenditures would be just under the 1983 level. With no 
change in regime, expenditures would grow 2.3 per cent annually. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Forecasts made under a wide range of alternative austerity and external 
debt assumptions indicate that the prospects are good that Argentina can 
pull itself out of the current crisis. Whjle it is impossible to predict the 
precise economic program which the government will enact, it is possible 
to narrow down the scope of change which is available to the authorities. 
MILITARY EXPENDITURE IN ARGENTINA 
TABLE 2 





















































The results obtained above clearly indicate that the best that can be 
hoped for is a moderately austere economic program where the external 
public debt is held constant and the real central bank credit to the public 
sector declines at an average annual rate of nearly 6 per cent. This will 
lead to non-recessionary rate of real growth in the GDP of 2.8 per cent. 
Private sector consumption and investment will grow at 2.4 and 5.2 per 
cent respectively. At the same time, the inflation rate will be dramatically 
reduced, the balance of payments will improve, and the government 
deficit will decline. 
For purposes of this study, the most significant result appears to be that 
the model shows that, given the political environment, military 
expenditures are largely influenced by economic conditions and the 
resources available to the authorities. A main implication is that it is 
extremely hazardous to forecast defense expenditures in developing 
countries without explicitly taking into account the macroeconomic 
priorities of the government, the policy constraints facing the authorities 
and the timing of their policy responses. The study also indicates that 
204 
TABLE 3 
MILITARY EXPENDITUREsa--HODERATE AUSTERITY 
No Change in Regime 
1987 Change in Regime 













sufficient bounds can be placed on allocations to the defense sector so as 
to permit realistic forecasts of future defense budgets. 
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2. Ibid., p. 81l. 
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tion and Development, 1985) and International Monetary Fund, International 
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and Consequences', in M. Wionczek, ed., Politics and Economics of External Debt 
Crisis: The Latin American Experience (Boulder, Colorado: The Westview Press, 
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9. The policy of controlling inflation through (pre-announced) devaluations has been 
ruled out following the problems encountered in the late 1970s. 
10. Diamond and Naswewski, op. cit., for some other assumptions in the model. 
11. In all forecasts, only the 1990 value is given although annual resul!s were estimated 
between 1985and1990. These are available upon request from the authors as are values 
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